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King (1997) develops a framework for assessing four monetary regimes: an op-
timal state-contingent rule; a non-contingent rule; pure discretion; and a Rogoﬃan
conservative central banker. Using this framework we show (a) that King is wrong to
claim that it implies that an optimally-conservative central banker always dominates
a ﬁxed-rule monetary regime; (b) that if the private sector has a signal of the shock
to which monetary policy responds - the accuracy of which is exogenously ﬁxed -then
either the optimal state-contingent rule or the optimally-conservative central bank
can dominate; and (c) that if the private sector optimally chooses the accuracy of its
signal then any regime can dominate.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
King (1997) presents a simple, standard model of monetary policy and uses
it to assess four monetary regimes: an optimal state-contingent rule; a
non-contingent rule; pure discretion; and a Rogoﬃan conservative central
banker. In each case the monetary authority sets the quantity of money in
full knowledge of the realization of the economy’s single (aggregate supply)
shock whereas the private sector forms its expectations before it observes
this shock.1 King draws a number of conclusions from this model, notably
that ‘both a non-contingent rule and the exercise of discretion are domi-
nated by the optimal state-contingent ‘rule’ ’ (King 1997, p.85), and that a
conservative central banker dominates ‘both a simple rule and the exercise
of discretion by a ‘representative’ central banker.’ (King 1997, p. 89).2
I nt h i sp a p e rw em a k et h r e em a i np o i n t s :ﬁrst, King’s own model, un-
modiﬁed, does not in fact imply that a conservative central banker dominates
a simple rule; secondly, a modiﬁcation to King’s model which permits the
private sector to have some signal of the aggregate shock, the accuracy of
which is exogenously ﬁxed, implies that the exercise of discretion by a Rogof-
ﬁan conservative central banker can dominate the optimal state-contingent
rule; and thirdly, if the private sector is assumed to be able to select the
accuracy of its signal then any of the regimes may dominate the others. The
second and, especially, the third points draw on a growing macroeconomic
literature which examines the implications of incomplete information. Typi-
cally in this literature, agents balance the costs and beneﬁts of making more
accurate expectations and will choose neither to be perfectly ill-informed nor
to use all available information.3 In King’s framework this approach sug-
gests that the private sector will choose to acquire some information about
the current realization of the aggregate supply shock rather than none at
all, but will stop short of being perfectly well-informed of its value. It also
implies, we suggest, that the accuracy of the information the private sec-
tor chooses to acquire will depend upon the monetary regime in operation:
diﬀerent monetary regimes imply diﬀerent costs of being misinformed and
therefore alter the private sector’s optimal level of information.
1This approach can be traced to Barro and Gordon (1983), Barro (1985), and Rogoﬀ
(1987) via Kydland and Prescott (1977).
2In fact at this point the article actually reads: ‘Hence the conservative central banker
determinates [sic] both a simple rule and the exercise of discretion by a ‘representa-
tive’ central banker’. We have assumed that the word ‘determinates’ is a misprint for
‘dominates’.
3This litererature is traceable at least to Feige and Pearce (1976) and Buiter (1980),
who argue that ‘economically rational’ agents may select an incomplete information set.
A more recent example in the theory of consumption is Pischke’s (1995) version of the
permanent income model. More appropriately in the context of this paper, Mankiw and
Reis (2002), Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2003) and Carroll (2003) analyse the eﬀects on
monetary policy and inﬂation of ‘rational inattentiveness’.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 2
The paper is in three sections. In the ﬁrst we outline King’s framework
and establish the ﬁrst point with a simple example. In the second we intro-
duce the idea that the private sector has some signal of the aggregate shock
and we show how this can change the ordering of regimes. In this section
we take the accuracy of the signal as exogenously given and the same for
each regime. In the third section we consider the implications of allowing
the private sector to select the degree of accuracy of its signal.
2 The King framework
The framework, using King’s notation, consists of four equations
y = y∗ + b[π − e π]+ε (1)
m = π + y (2)
m = λ1 + λ2ε (3)
L = aEπ2 + E(y − ky∗)2 (4)
where equation (1) is an aggregate supply relationship with standard nota-
tion: y is (the log of) real aggregate output; y∗ is the natural level of output
rate; π is the inﬂation rate; e π is the private sector’s expected inﬂation rate;
ε is an aggregate supply shock; and b is a positive parameter; equation (2)
is the quantity theory with constant velocity; equation (3) represents the
policy regime; and equation (4) is the loss function of the ‘representative
agent’ in which a is the weight attached to inﬂation, k ≥ 1 and E is the
expectations operator. Equations (1)-(3) imply
π =
λ1 − y∗ +( λ2 − 1)ε + be π
1+b
(5)
y − ky∗ =














King’s ﬁrst regime - the optimal state-contingent rule - is deﬁn e db yt h e
values of λ1 and λ2 that minimise the (unconditional) loss function on the
assumption that expectations are rational and that the rule can be enforced.
Formally, King uses equation (5) to derive an expression for e π (by running
the ˆ operator through it and solving for e π) ,a n dt h e nm i n i m i s i n gL with
respect to λ1 and λ2. The second regime - the non-contingent rule - is
deﬁned by setting λ2 to zero and repeating the previous exercise to ﬁnd the
optimal value of λ1.
The third and fourth regimes - pure discretion and the Rogoﬃan conser-
vative central banker - are derived by minimising L with respect to λ1 and
λ2 taking e π as given; in the Rogoﬃan case χ replaces a ,w h e r eχ = a/ρ
and, if the central banker is ‘conservative’, 0 < ρ < 1.4 The value of e π is
4The regime that King calls the ‘inﬂation nutter’ regime corresponds to ρ =0 ;t h e
‘employment nutter’ regime corresponds to ρ →∞ . Pure discretion corresponds to ρ =1 .Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 3
then derived from the implied optimising inﬂation rate and the assumption
of rational expectations.
The value of the loss function under each regime can be written:





















where z =( k−1)y∗; σ2
ε is the variance of ε;a n dt h eO, R, D and C subscripts
refer, respectively, to the optimal state-contingent rule, the non-contingent
rule, pure discretion, and the conservative central banker.
King claims (1997, p. 89) that it ‘is straightforward to show that the
optimal value of ρ satisﬁes 0 < ρ < 1. Hence it is optimal to delegate control
of a central bank which exercises discretion to a ‘conservative’ central bank
governor ( LC <L D).H o w e v e r ,a tt h eo p t i m a lρ, LC <L R.’ On the basis
of these results King claims that the conservative central banker dominates
‘both a simple rule and the exercise of discretion by a ‘representative’ central
banker.’
King’s assertion that at the optimal value of ρ LC <L R,c a ne a s i l y
be shown to be wrong. Assume values of 1 for the key parameters a, σ2
ε,
and z; and assume that b =2 . Under these conditions the optimal value
of ρ is 0.1721,5 the value of LR is 1.2222, and the value of LC (with ρ =
0.1721)i s1.5108.6 Clearly under these conditions the conservative central
banker is dominated by a non-contingent rule. These conditions are not in
this respect unique: there are many parameter values which imply that the
non-contingent rule dominates the Rogoﬃan optimally-conservative central
banker; and many in which the reverse is true; neither regime dominates the
other in all circumstances.
5This optimal value was found numerically.
6Under these same conditions the value of LO is 1.2; and the value of LD is 5.2.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 4
3 The King framework with an exogenously informed pri-
vate sector
In deriving the loss associated with each regime, King assumes that the
private sector’s expectation of ε is zero. This has been a common-enough
assumption in such models, but, in the light of the recent literature noted
above in which agents choose their information, it is now somewhat jarring.
Why should the private sector choose to be totally ignorant of something
that is important to it and about which the government is perfectly well-
informed? If the private sector has any control over its ability to predict
the value of ε then the normal economic calculus - in this case the balancing
of the costs and beneﬁts of predicting ε more accurately - will lead it to
choose to be completely ill-informed only under very special circumstances.
We consider what these costs and beneﬁt sm i g h tb em o r ef u l l yi nt h en e x t
section but for the moment we shall assume that agent j in the private sector
has access in period t t oas i g n a lo ft h i se r r o r ,ηj,w h e r e
ηj = ε + ωj
ωj is the noise in the signal which we assume is Gaussian white noise; its
variance, σ2
ω, is a measure of the (in)accuracy of the agent’s information.7
We assume that each agent can, by incurring the costs of obtaining more,
or higher-quality, information, choose the variance of ωj.8 For simplicity
we also assume that the terms in ωj sum to zero over all individuals. We
therefore write the private sector’s expectation of ε as






ω and hence 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. A value of zero for γ corresponds to
the standard King case; a value of 1 corresponds to the private sector being
as well-informed as the monetary authority.
In this section we shall treat the value of γ as exogenous and the same in
each regime. Using a procedure similar to the one described in the previous
section - and explained more fully in Appendix A - but replacing, where
appropriate, e ε =0with e ε = γε, we can derive the following loss functions
for each regime.
• Optimal state-contingent rule
LO = φOσ2





b(1 − γ)(1 + bγ)





a(1 + bγ)2 + b2(1 − γ)2
&2
7To keep the notation as uncluttered as possible we ignore the time subscript.
8Agents are assumed to know the variance of ε.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 5
• A non-contingent rule
LR = φRσ2






































































Table 1 shows the losses that would occur in each regime for a small
number of selected parameter values, and illustrates three main features of
our initial extension to the King framework:10 ﬁrst as γ rises, the losses for
each regime tend to rise, though this is not always true in the case of pure
discretion; second a change in γ can alter the ordering of the regimes’ losses;
and third,when γ =0or γ =1LO is always as low or lower than LR, LD,
and LC.
9Note that this function contains both a and χ: the former because the loss function is
for ‘society’ not for the central banker; the latter because the central banker’s weighting
of inﬂation against output determines the actual policy response.
10Another feature illustrated by the table is that for all values of γ, LO ≤ LR,a n d
LD ≤ LC. This is because because the non-contingent rule is a restricted case of the
optimal state-contingent rule, and the Rogoﬃan conservative central banker is the optimal
case of pure discretion.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 6
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γ LO LR LD LC ρ∗
σ2
ε =1 ;a =0 .1; b =0 .1; k =1 .1; y∗ =1 .
0.00 0.919 0.919 0.920 0.920 0.987
0.25 0.959 0.965 0.963 0.957 0.741
0.50 0.988 1.012 1.009 0.986 0.494
0.75 1.005 1.061 1.058 1.004 0.247
1.00 1.010 1.110 1.111 1.010 0.000
σ2
ε =1 ;a =0 .1;b =2 .0; k =1 .1; y∗ =1 .0
0.000 0.034 0.132 0.434 0.057 0.171
0.250 0.101 0.285 52.975 0.055 0.072
0.500 0.296 0.499 96.353 0.103 0.072
0.750 0.724 0.774 99.324 0.299 0.088
1.000 1.010 1.110 41.410 1.010 0.000
σ2
ε =1 ;a =2 .0; b =0 .1; k =1 .1; y∗ =1 .0
0.000 1.005 2.489 1.005 1.005 0.990
0.250 1.007 2.615 1.008 1.007 0.742
0.500 1.009 2.743 1.010 1.009 0.495
0.750 1.010 2.875 1.013 1.010 0.247
1.000 1.010 3.010 1.015 1.010 0.000
The underlying cause of all these features is that, in this class of model,
if γ < 1 a supply shock will tend to create unexpected inﬂation and therefore
cause output to deviate from its natural level, y∗ + ε. For example, if
there were a negative aggregate supply shock then, in the case of the non-
contingent rule, where there is a ﬁxed quantity of money and ﬁxed velocity
- and therefore a ﬁxed level of nominal aggregate demand - the reduction
in output will inevitably raise prices. If γ =0then this rise in prices
will be entirely unexpected and will tend to stimulate output, thereby, to
some extent, oﬀsetting its initial fall. The resulting combination of higher
inﬂation and reduced output will deliver the loss caused by this shock under
this regime.
T h eo t h e rr e g i m e se x e r c i s es o m ec h o i c eo v e rt h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h e y
allow the supply shock to generate unexpected inﬂation and hence the extent
to which they allow output to deviate from its natural rate. The various
regimes diﬀer in the amount of unexpected inﬂation they allow the supply
shock to generate, and thereby the extent to which they allow it to cause
deviations of output and inﬂation from their respective desired levels, but
the underlying mechanism is the same. For those regimes that can exercise
discretion, the fact that they have some power to select the level of output
has a second eﬀect: it leads the private sector to anticipate the exercise ofIqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 7
that power and hence leads it to expect a higher level of inﬂation. This is
t h es o u r c eo ft h ew e l l - k n o w ni n ﬂationary bias in such regimes.
Ar i s ei nγ generally increases the losses under any regime because it
reduces the extent to which the supply shock creates unexpected inﬂation,
and hence reduces the scope each regime has to move output to its desired
level (ky∗). The reason it can change the ranking of the regimes is that the
rise in γ aﬀects them diﬀerentially. One reason for this is that, for those
regimes which allow discretion, the rise in γ will alter the private sector’s
assessment of the extent to which the monetary authority will exploit its
ability to cause output to deviate from its natural rate. It will therefore
alter the degree of inﬂationary bias. For such regimes, this second, and
potentially beneﬁcial, eﬀect of a rise in γ can oﬀset the eﬀect of the ﬁrst
and lead to lower losses. Because a rise in γ has diﬀerential eﬀects on the
four regimes - especially as between those regimes that allow discretion and
those that do not - it can change the ordering of the losses associated with
each of them.
The optimal state-contingent rule dominates when γ =0because, under
this condition, a monetary authority that can credibly pre-commit to a
state-contingent rule can select from outcomes where, whatever the value
of the shock and the selected value of λ2, expected inﬂation is zero. Under
pure discretion, expectations of inﬂation are also independent of the shock
when γ =0 , but, because of its associated inﬂationary bias, pure discretion
can, in contrast, only select outcomes involving expected inﬂation of b
a(k −
1)y∗. For each possible value of ε, the optimal state-contingent regime can
always select the same output as would pure discretion but, given expected
inﬂation of zero, the level of inﬂation associated with each outcome would be
lower. Hence the optimal state-contingent regime will always dominate pure
discretion. For the same reason it will dominate the Rogoﬃan conservative
central banker, although the dominance will be less the more conservative
the central banker is. And, of course, it dominates the non-contingent rule
since that rule is a special case of the optimal state-contingent rule.
When 0 < γ ≤ 1 it is no longer true that, under an optimal state-
contingent regime, expected inﬂation will be zero whatever the value of the
shock and the selected value of λ2. For example, a negative shock will to
some extent now be anticipated and this will tend to produce an expectation
of positive inﬂation. This can be reduced by an appropriate selection of
λ2 but this in turn will, provided γ < 1, have implications for unexpected
inﬂation and output volatility. The set of outcomes from which an optimal
state-contingent regime can choose is therefore restricted by the rise in γ.S o
too are the sets of outcomes from which the other regimes can choose, but
in the case of the Rogoﬃan conservative central banker this restriction can,
to some degree, be oﬀset by changing the degree of conservativeness. As a
result the Rogoﬃan conservative central banker can, as Table 1 illustrates,
dominate the optimal state-contingent rule when 0 < γ ≤ 1.T h i si saf u r t h e rIqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 8
reason why a rise in γ can change the rankings of the regimes’ losses.
When γ =1the set of possible inﬂation-output combinations available
under each regime is restricted to those where output equals y∗+ ε.A
state-contingent rule exists which ensures that at each such output level
inﬂation is zero; in the other regimes (unless the Rogoﬃan conservative
central banker is an ‘inﬂation nutter’) these output levels generally involve
non-zero inﬂation rates. Hence the state-contingent rule is again inevitably
dominant.
4 The King framework with an optimally informed private
sector
The previous section assumes that γ is exogenous and the same in each
regime. But diﬀerent regimes clearly create diﬀerent economic environ-
ments within which private agents have to operate. It is odd to assume
that agents’ behaviour is unresponsive to these diﬀerences. For example,
each of the regimes has diﬀerent implications for the variance of inﬂation
around its expected value. Being wrong about inﬂation will impose some
costs on individuals in the private sector: it inevitably means that they
will make important decisions which they later regret.11 To the extent that
they can control the degree of inaccuracy of their inﬂationary expectations
we would expect private agents to select diﬀerent γsf o rd i ﬀerent regimes:
regimes which typically produce little unexpected inﬂation will allow agents
to economise on information gathering and operate with a lower γ.
To capture this idea as simply as possible we assume that the total
expected beneﬁts and the total costs of being well-informed are functions
solely of E (π − e π)
2. Again for simplicity, we specify the functions as
TB= A − ec1x (15)
TC = e−c2x (16)
where TB represents the expected beneﬁts, and TC the expected costs, of
being informed; x ≡ E (π − e π)
2; A, c1,a n dc2 are arbitrary constants. Equa-
tion (15) is consistent with agents’ total beneﬁts declining at an increasing
rate as the inaccuracy of their expectations increases. Equation (16) is con-
sistent with their total costs declining at a decreasing rate as the inaccuracy
of their expectations increases. These functional forms also imply an ‘opti-
mal’ value of E (π − e π)
2 which is constant across regimes (see Appendix B)
but an optimal value of γ which diﬀers across regimes.
11The model itself implies that mistakes about inﬂation induce suppliers to supply a
diﬀerent amount of output from the one they would have supplied if they had known the
true value of the shock.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 9
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ε =1 ;k =1 .1;y∗ =1 ;A =1 ;c1 =1 .25;c2 =3
Regime LO <L C < LR <L C < LD <L C < LC <L O <
Ordering LR <L D LO <L D LO <L R LR <L D
Parameters
a 1.000 0.100 0.800 0.100
b 1.500 0.300 1.900 0.200
Optimal γs and ρ
γ∗
O 0.065 0.553 0.111 0.479
γ∗
R 0.167 0.485 0.237 0.505
γ∗
D 0.569 0.836 0.016 0.756
γ∗
C 0.147 0.578 0.231 0.497
ρ∗ 0.630 0.404 0.412 0.492
These optimal values of γ are highly complex functions of the underly-
ing parameters of the model and may not lie in the economically meaningful
region between 0 and 1. We therefore use numerical methods to derive
the losses associated with each regime under the assumption that the pri-
vate sector selects the optimal values of γ in the region between zero and
one, and, in the case of the conservative central banker, that the central
banker has the optimal degree of ‘conservativeness’.12 These are suﬃcient
to demonstrate the central point of this section: that, depending upon the
economy’s parameter values, any of the four monetary regimes can dominate
the others. In Table 2 we illustrate this point with examples which are not
intended to be realistic but which demonstrate that diﬀerent values for the
model’s underlying parameters can lead to a re-ordering of the regimes and
to any of the regimes being dominant.
At the head of each column we show the ordering of the regimes’ losses
for the assumed parameter values, and in the rows below we show the as-
sociated optimal values of γ and ρ. So, taking the second column as an
example: if the values of a and b are 0.1 and 0.3 respectively, then a non-
contingent rule dominates the three other regimes; the optimal value of γ
ranges from 0.485 i nt h en o n - c o n t i n g e n tr u l er e g i m e ,t o0.836 i nt h ec a s eo f
pure discretion; and the optimal degree of conservativeness in the case of
the Rogoﬃan conservative central banker is 0.404.
12We used a grid search in steps of 0.0001 over the range zero to one to ﬁnd the optimal
values of γ for regimes O, R,a n dD,d e ﬁned as the value of γ which maximises TB−TC.
For regime C the process is more complicated because there are two optimising processes:
for any initial value of ρ the private sector selects the optimal value of γ, i.e. the value of
γ which maximises TB− TC;f o rt h i sv a l u eo fγ, there is an optimal value of ρ,i . e .t h e
value which minimises LC; but this optimal value of ρ may not equal the initial value.
The value of γ
∗
C shown in the table is the value which minimised the squared diﬀerence
between the initial and optimal values of ρ;t h ev a l u eo fρ
∗ shown is the optimal value of
ρ for this value of γ. The grid search took place over the range of 0 to 1 for γ in steps of
0.0001, and over the range 0.0001 to 1 for ρ in steps of 0.0001.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 10
5 Conclusions
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v es h o w nﬁrst that, contrary to King’s assertion and with
no modiﬁcation to his framework, a Rogoﬃan conservative central banker
with an optimal degree of ‘conservativeness’ will not always dominate a
simple non-contingent rule. More importantly and more generally, we have
used King’s framework to explore the implications of allowing the private
sector to have some signal of the shock to which monetary policy responds.
We have ﬁrst assumed that the accuracy of this signal is exogenously given
and the same under each monetary regime. We have then, in as simple a
way as possible, assumed that the private sector chooses the degree of this
accuracy. The main implication of our ﬁrst modiﬁcation is that dominance
of the optimal state-contingent rule is undermined: which regime dominates
the others is to some extent dependent upon the accuracy of the signal,
together with the particular values of the economy’s other parameters. The
second modiﬁcation takes this argument one stage further: any regime can
in fact dominate the others and there is therefore no clear preference for an
optimal state-contingent rule or a Rogoﬃan conservative central banker, or
any other conventional monetary regime.Iqirupdwlrqdo Affxudf| dqg wkh Oswlpdo Mrqhwdu| Rhjlph 11
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• The optimal state-contingent rule
From equation (5) of the text derive
e π = λ1 +( λ2 − 1)γε− y∗
and hence
π = λ1 − y∗ +
(λ2 − 1)(1 + bγ)ε
1+b
y = y∗ + φ1ε
where
φ1 =
1+b + b(1 − γ)(λ2 − 1)
1+b
The unconditional expectation of π2 and (y − ky∗)2 can be written
Eπ2 =( λ1 − y∗)2 +






E(y − ky∗)2 =( y∗(1 − k))2 + φ2
1σ2
ε












+(y∗(1 − k))2 + φ2
1σ2
ε
Minimising LO with respect to λ1 and λ2 gives
λ1 = y∗
λ2 =
a(1 + bγ)2 − b(1 − γ)(1+bγ)
a(1 + bγ)2 + b(1 − γ)b(1 − γ)
and hence
πO = −
b(1 − γ)(1 + bγ)
a(1 + bγ)2 + b2(1 − γ)2ε
yO = y∗ +
a(1 + bγ)2
a(1 + bγ)2 + b2(1 − γ)2ε
LO = φOσ2





b(1 − γ)(1 + bγ)





a(1 + bγ)2 + b2(1 − γ)2
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• The non-contingent rule
Under this regime λ2 =0but the value of λ1 remains at y∗.T h e s ev a l u e s




















Under this regime the authorities take e π as given and select the optimal
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Optimising with respect to λ1 and λ2 implies
λ1 =





So in this case we have






bθ1(1 + b) − b2


























Since 1 − θ3 = a
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• Rogoﬃan conservative central banker
Under this regime we replace a with χ in the expressions derived above
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Asshqgl{ BT kh rswlpdo ghjuhh ri lqdffxudf|
Assume that the total beneﬁts of accuracy are the following declining
function of x =(E (π − e π)
2)
TB= A − ef1(x)











So the total beneﬁts decline as x increases and at a rate that itself increases
with x.
Assume further that the total costs of being well-informed are also a
declining function of x but that in this case they decline at a rate that falls













The optimal value of x, x∗, can in principle be found by ﬁrst diﬀerentiating












and x∗ is found by solving this equation. If we make the simplifying as-
sumptions used in the text,
f1(x)=c1x
f2(x)=c2x
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It is straightforward to derive the following expressions for x = E (π − e π)
2
for the diﬀerent regimes:
xO =
%
−b(1 − γ)2(1 + bγ)































By setting each of these equal to x∗and solving for γ we can derive the
value of γ that optimising agents will select under each regime.